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The Supreme Court, The First Amendment, and
Anti- Sex-Discrimination Legislation: Putting
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut
in Perspective
Georgia Wralstad Ulmschneider*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, commentators and scholars have written extensively about the feminist challenge to the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine,' the proposed feminist-inspired anti-pornography
ordinances which defined pornography as a form of sex discrimination,2 and the Supreme Court's summary affirmation of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in American Booksellers
Association, Inc. v. Hudnuts which struck down an anti-pornography ordinance enacted in Indianapolis, Indiana." Throughout their
writings, commentators and scholars have analyzed the feminist
approach to pornography and have compared it to the Supreme
Court's approach to obscenity, 5 discussed the theoretical implications that the feminist-inspired ordinances have on the Supreme
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort
Wayne. I would like to thank Jane E. Malloy for her invaluable insight and assistance with
this article. Also, I would like to thank Marci A. Irey, Debra L. Sewards, and especially
Barbara L. Blauvelt for their help in preparing this article for publication.

1. See, e.g.,

JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE

331-49 (1991).

2. See e.g, William E. Brigman, Pornographyas Group Libel: the Indianapolis Sex
Discrimination Ordinance, 18 IND L. REV. 479 (1985).
3. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).

4. See e.g.,

DEBORAH

L.

RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER

270-73 (1989).

5. See e.g., Sue Bessmer, Antiobscenity: A Comparison of the Legal and the Feminist Perspectives, in WOMEN, POWER AND POLICY 167-83 (Ellen Boneparth ed. 1982).
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Court's obscenity doctrine,6 and dissected the lower courts' opinions in Hudnut in light of these issues."
In all of these discussions, however, little attention has been
paid to the fact that the anti-discrimination legislation at issue in
Hudnut not only challenged the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine and its First Amendment jurisprudence, but also challenged
the conceptual framework on which the Court has based much of
its First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, scholars and commentators have virtually ignored the fact that Hudnut is only one
in a series of cases in which legislation barring sex discrimination
gave rise to claims that questioned the Court's First Amendment
conceptual framework." Hudnut was, however, the only case in
which the Supreme Court was not able to adhere to its First
Amendment doctrines and still uphold the anti-sex-discrimination
legislation at issue.
Accordingly, it is important to take a fresh look at Hudnut and
all of the cases that challenged anti-sex-discrimination legislation
as violative of the First Amendment. A close analysis will reveal
not only why Hudnut does not conform to the Supreme Court's
decisional pattern, but also much about the Court's vision of gender equality, its dilemma in using a conceptual framework that is
both time and situation-bound, and its role in the American political system.
II.

RECONCILING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES OF LIBERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

EQUALITY: The

FRAMEWORK

The Supreme Court's modern approach to the protection of free
expression rights can, in large measure, be traced to opinions authored by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Holmes and Brandeis articulated their philosophical visions for the constitutional protection of free speech in early political speech cases.9 Both Justices
argued that the constitutional foundation for free speech lies in the
free marketplace theory. Holmes asserted that suppression of
speech interferes with society's best mechanism for discovering the
6. See, e.g., Eric Hoffman, Note, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 497 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Comment, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination,9 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POLICY 461 (1986).
8. One exception is Herma H. Kay, Notes on Rotary International, N.Y. State Club
Ass'n and Hudnut, in SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 152, 158 (3d ed. 1988).
9. See note 17 and accompanying text.
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truth, the marketplace of ideas.1" In Holmes' view, government
should generally remain a neutral bystander in the free speech
arena.1" Brandeis later extended the free marketplace theory of the
First Amendment by specifically tying it to the search for political
truth. Free speech, Brandeis suggested, enhances democratic decisionmaking through political debate and is thus essential to selfgovernment. 2 Implicit in Brandeis' argument was the idea that by
allowing a political minority the opportunity to become a majority
through criticism, persuasion and debate, free speech would ensure
the prospects for peaceful political and social change. 3 Consequently, both Holmes and Brandeis expressed dissatisfaction with
the Supreme Court's initial First Amendment test, the bad tendency test.14 In their view, this test gave the government too much
latitude in suppressing minority political viewpoints that the government deemed harmful. 15 According to Brandeis and Holmes,
the proper test would only allow the government to suppress
speech if the danger flowing from the speech was "so imminent
that it would befall before there was an opportunity for
discussion.""8
Holmes' and Brandeis' approach to the First Amendment was
both reflective of and responsive to a common disputing arrangement present in the cases that they heard. In all of these cases, the
disputes centered around the same basic fact scenario: political minorities, members of the radical left, had asserted free speech
rights against efforts by various governmental authorities to restrict their political views.1 7 Out of this disputing arrangement,
free speech rights became associated with minority interests and
10. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., concurring).
13. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
14. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), specifically Justice Sanford's majority opinion, for a classic formulation of the bad tendency test. Under the bad tendency test,
speech may be suppressed by the government if the speech has a tendency to produce bad
effects, even distant ones. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 671. Moreover, under this test, legislation
regulating speech is presumed to be valid and thus receives no closer judicial scrutiny than
other legislation. Id. at 668.
15. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376-77 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. These cases include Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); and Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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calls for political and social change. In addition, free speech became counterpoised to government regulation and defense of the
status quo in society. This perspective on the interrelationship between free speech rights, minority interests, and democracy was
the basis for two ideas found in Holmes' and Brandeis' approach to
the First Amendment: (1) that the protection of free speech rights
would result in the protection of minority interests and thus would
preserve and advance democracy,"8 and (2) that free speech rights
were negative liberties to be protected from governmental interference.19 In effect, this common disputing arrangement served as the
framework on which Holmes and Brandeis built their liberal approach to the protection of First Amendment free speech rights.
Holmes' and Brandeis' liberal approach to free speech, particularly speech concerning political and social issues, has generally
prevailed as a core element of the Supreme Court's First Amendment theory.2 0 The trend in the Court has been both to strengthen
this approach and to broaden it to encompass expression traditionally thought to be nonprotected, such as nude dancing, libel, and
commercial advertisement." The social ferment of the 1960s and
the early 1970s set the stage for such an expansion of the Court's
liberal free speech doctrine. Vietnam War protests, consumer activism, and the sexual liberation movement presented the Court
with opportunities to broaden its interpretation of First Amendment free expression rights based upon the need to democratize
the marketplace of ideas and upon the importance of preserving
state neutrality in matters of individual choice and morality.2"
Most importantly, the civil rights struggle spawned a series of
cases which linked the expansion of free expression to the revolution underway in constitutional theory concerning the principle of
equality.2 The Court had initiated an effort to make the principle
of equality a constitutional reality. To this end, the Court began to
18.
19.
20.

See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
See id. at 374.
Donald A. Downs, Beyond Modernist Liberalism: Toward a Reconstruction of

Free Speech Doctrine, in JUDGING

THE CONSTITUTION

317, 320 (Michael W. McCann & Ger-

ald L. Houseman eds. 1989).
21. Id. at 322. See also, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(nude dancing can fall within the rubric of First Amendment protection); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment protection extends to truthful, legal commercial speech); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (seditious libel receives First Amendment protection unless the remarks
are made with "actual malice").
22. Downs, cited at note 20, at 322-24.
23. See, e.g., HARVEY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).

1994

Putting Hudnut in Perspective

invoke the equal protection clause on behalf of minority groups in
order to lessen the barriers of racial segregation and to redress past
discriminatory practices. 24 In addition, the Court began to recognize the free expression claims of civil rights activists by refining
its public forum and group association doctrines.25 In this way,
First Amendment free expression rights became even more interwoven with minority interests and the democratization of American society. In the Court's view, the First Amendment was to be
used as a weapon by minorities seeking greater political and social
equality. The First Amendment was considered a "vehicle by
which otherwise powerless people [could] gain power .... ",26 This
vision of the First Amendment would be seriously challenged, however, when the Court was called upon to reconcile free expression
rights with anti-sex-discrimination legislation.

III. RECONCILING FREE SPEECH RIGHTS WITH ANTI-SEXDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S
DECISIONS
A series of sex discrimination cases starting in the 1970s posed a
fundamental philosophical challenge to the Court's view of the
First Amendment as an instrument of political and social change.27
In these cases, the opponents, rather than the supporters of various governmental anti-discrimination measures, attempted to invoke the First Amendment to support their positions, and, in effect, constrain legislative attempts to equalize women's status.
Accordingly, free expression rights in these cases were not associated with minority interests and calls for social change. Instead,
free expression rights were aligned with the defense of the status
quo in society and were pitted against minority interests, 28 calls for
24. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's antimiscegenation law
violated equal protection).
25. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (civil rights demonstration on state capital grounds is constitutionally-protected expression in a public forum);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (NAACP's membership list protected from compulsory disclosure under the First Amendment derivative right of association).
26. Mark Tushet, Corporationsand Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253, 257 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
27. These cases include University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990);
New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); American Booksellers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); and
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
28. See Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Protection: Gender and Justice, in JUDGING THE
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social change, and governmental regulation. Thus, these cases
posed a jurisprudential dilemma for the Court as they contradicted
the Court's conceptual framework. The Court was faced with the
prospect of having to choose between protecting free expression
rights or protecting minority interests, a prospect not contemplated by the conceptual framework on which the Court had built
much of its First Amendment theory.2 9 Moreover, such a choice
posed a philosophical dilemma for the Court, which perceived its
role in American politics as guardian of both free expression and
equal rights.30 Consequently, the Court's vision of both the free expression and equality claims at stake in these cases was crucial not
only to the disposition of the individual cases, but to the Court's
ability to maintain its First Amendment philosophy and still support the advancement of equality for women.
A. Commercial
Legislation

Advertising

versus

Anti-Sex-Discrimination

The first case to pit free expression rights against minority interests was the 1973 case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.3 1 In that case, the Pittsburgh
Human Relations Commission's ("Commission") enforcement of
Pittsburgh's "human relations" ordinance prohibited the Pittsburgh Press from running sex-designated help-wanted advertisements.3 2 The Pittsburgh Press argued that such a ban restricted its
editorial judgment"3 and was a prior restraint upon First Amendment freedoms of expression, specifically freedom of the press, and
therefore, should be stricken. 4 The Court disagreed and upheld
the order.3 5 Citing a 1942 case, Valentine v. Chrestensen,3' the
Court held that the advertisements were purely commercial speech
cited at note 20, at 265, 271 (arguing that American women, a numerical
majority, assume the functional characteristics of a minority).
29. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
30. See generally, MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
has so
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1966). Shapiro argues that "the debate over freedom of speech ...
intermingled freedom of speech and role of the Court questions that they have become inseparable." Id at 1.
31. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 380-81.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Id. at 389.
35. Id. at 381.
36. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that commercial handbills are outside the scope of
First Amendment protection).
CONSTITUTION,
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not encompassing the public policy view of the newspaper or its
columnists or contributors, and thus, were outside the scope of
First Amendment protection.3 7 The Court concluded that the
Commission's order did not constrain the editorial judgment of the
Pittsburgh Press because it did not prohibit the newspaper from
publishing stories, advertisements, and opinions commenting on or
criticizing the ordinance.3 8 Moreover, the Court held that the sexdesignated help-wanted advertisements constituted unlawful employment discrimination and that "[any] First Amendment interest which might be served by an ordinary commercial proposal and
which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to
a valid limitation on economic activity." 9 In addition, the Court
held that an advertisement promoting an unlawful activity, such as
discrimination, may be forbidden because it threatens to cause injury which the government has the power to prevent. 0
Pittsburgh Press was decided by the Court at a time that was
ripe for the advancement of women's rights. By 1973, a multiplicity of political and social changes involving women had taken
place. The women's movement was at its zenith."1 Women were attending colleges and entering the workforce at higher rates than
ever before."3 The Equal Rights Amendment had been approved
in twenty-two states and its ratification appeared imminent.4 3 The
Burger Court had heightened the level of scrutiny used to review
sex discrimination cases under the Equal Protection Clause 44 and a
plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson,4 5 had held that
sex was a suspect classification. 4 The Court, aware of the demo37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 388.
Leslie F. Goldstein, Sex as a Semisuspect Classification,in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 109, 111 (rev. ed. 1988).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 112.
44. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho
statute preferring males over females as estate administrators). This was the first time in its
decisional history that the Supreme Court declared a state statute unconstitutional on the
grounds of sex discrimination. HOFF, cited at note 1, at 247.
45. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute requiring female,
but not male, armed services members to prove spousal financial dependence before spousal
benefits were awarded).
46. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
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graphic changes that had taken place in American society, abandoned the traditional stereotypical notions of women as homemakers operating primarily in the private sphere and recognized
women as workers in the public sphere.4 7 Furthermore, the Court
had not yet broadened its free expression doctrine under a public
information rationale to encompass commercial speech.' 8 Consequently, Pittsburgh Press contained many factual and legal elements that led to a decision supportive of the Commission's order
and few elements that did not. Pittsburgh Press involved commercial advertising and women workers. The order was aimed at providing women the same opportunities as men in securing employment in the public sphere.' 9 It was not aimed at transforming
women's status in the private sphere nor did it challenge traditional stereotypical notions of women's sexual roles-much more
radical demands to which the Supreme Court, steeped in liberal
political theory, would later prove to be less sympathetic."
Hence, the PittsburghPress Court's vision of commercial speech
as expression far removed from the core First Amendment concerns of democratic self-government, coupled with the Court's liberal approach to gender equality, allowed the Court to respond
positively to women's equality claims. The Court's response advanced the pace of social reform without requiring the Court to
undertake the more difficult task of reassessing its First Amendment framework and theory. The Supreme Court majority did not
even appear to perceive the PittsburghPress dispute as one which
challenged the Court's vision of the First Amendment as an instrument for social change and a vehicle for the advancement of minority interests. The Court's opinion did not address the conflict
between the constitutional values of liberty and equality present in
the Court's free expression theory although the case clearly
portends of the potential conflict. In an attempt to deal with the
equality concerns in this free expression case, the Court instead
framed the issue in terms of the category of speech involved.5 1 In
the majority's view and despite arguments to the contrary by Jus47.

HOFF, cited at note 1, at 249.

48.

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

§12-15, at 891 (2d ed. 1988).

49. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376.
50. See notes 105-57, 180-83, 193 and accompanying text. See generally HOFF, cited
at note 1, at 21-48 (arguing that liberal theory reflects traditional sexual divisions of
society).
51. See note 37 and accompanying text.
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tice Douglas in dissent,5 the case did not involve viewpoint expression, but only commercial speech which proposed illegal activity.
This judicial categorization alone was dispositive of the dispute.
Judicial categorization, however, would not so easily resolve the
disputes in cases involving freedom of association.
B. Freedom of Association versus Anti-Sex-Discrimination
Legislation
Following the Pittsburgh Press decision, the next series of cases
offering possible challenges to the Supreme Court's First Amendment framework involved a derivative First Amendment right,
freedom of association."3 The Court was again faced with the prospect of having to deal directly with the conflict between free expression and equality claims and the ramifications this conflict
would have on the Court's First Amendment framework.
In the first of these cases, Hishon v. King & Spalding,5" the conflict between free expression and equality did not materialize. The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, interpreted Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as forbidding sex discrimination in law
firm partnership decisions. 5 In so holding, the Court rejected King
& Spalding's contentions that such an application of Title VII
would infringe upon the firm's rights of freedom of expression and
association. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger concluded that King & Spalding simply had not shown that the abilities of its lawyers "to make a distinctive contribution . . . to the
ideas and beliefs of our society" would be inhibited by the Court's
application of the Civil Rights Act.5 7 Moreover, Burger held that
engaging in private discrimination is a form of association that has
never been afforded constitutional protection.5 8 Accordingly, the
association in Hishon, like the advertisements in PittsburghPress,
was found to be unworthy of constitutional protection. Again, the
52. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 397-98 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
53. In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has held that the right to freedom of association is derived from the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, petition,
and assembly. These cases include NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
54. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
55. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73.
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Court resolved the dispute through simple judicial categorization.
By disposing of the case through judicial categorization, the
Court again avoided any disruption of its First Amendment framework and still furthered legislative attempts to equalize women's
status in the commercial marketplace, a gender equality demand
for which the Court had already shown sympathy in Pittsburgh
Press.5 9 The Court averted the need to make a value choice between liberty and equality by simply categorizing the association in
Hishon as a non-liberty. Accordingly, the Court was able to decide
Hishon in such a way that did not force the Court to grapple with
the issue of whether the Court's First Amendment framework adequately captured the complexity of the relationship between the
constitutional values of liberty and equality. Hishon, therefore, left
numerous questions unanswered. What would the Court do when
confronted with a factual situation that would not allow the Court
to easily duck a value choice between liberty and equality? What
would happen if the Court found valid free expression claims pitted against women's equality demands? Would it adhere to its
First Amendment jurisprudential approach in resolving the dispute
or would the Court abandon its First Amendment framework?
The next series of cases involving both freedom of association
claims and women's equality claims addressed some of these issues.
Each of the cases, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 0 Board of
Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte,6 ' and
New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 2 involved the exclusion of women from men's clubs or service organizations. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court rejected First
Amendment freedom of association challenges to state or local
public accommodation laws used to combat the sex-based membership policies of men's clubs and service organizations. 3
In New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York,
the New York State Club Association ("State Club Association")
brought a facial challenge to the New York ordinance before enforcement proceedings were initiated against its member clubs."
Based on this challenge, the Supreme Court only focused on the
59. See notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
60. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
61. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
62. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
63. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612; Rotary International,481 U.S. at 544; New York State
Club Association, 487 U.S. at 14.
64. New York State Club Association, 487 U.S. at 11.
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extraordinary requirements that must be met by a plaintiff who
mounts a facial attack. The Court required such plaintiffs to show
that the challenged ordinance either "could never be applied in a
valid manner '' 5 or that it was substantially overbroad.6 6 Not sur6 7
prisingly, the State Club Association failed on both counts.
Therefore, the Court did not have to reach the underlying First
Amendment issues in the dispute and was able to avoid having to
choose between protecting free expression rights or protecting minority interests. Accordingly, the Court did not have to address a
challenge to its First Amendment framework.
This was not the situation, however, in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees and Board of Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary
Club of Duarte.6 8 In both of these cases, the Court reached the
substantive nature of the First Amendment freedom of association
claims that were asserted. The organizations argued that their
rights of associational freedom were violated by the application of
state public accommodations statutes which banned sex-based admissions policies. These statutes, it was asserted, interfered with
the members' rights not to associate and with the organizations'
internal structure and affairs.6 9
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Jaycees, developed
a structure for analyzing freedom of association claims in disputes
of this type. He distinguished between two types of associational
freedoms protected under the Constitution, intimate association
and expressive association.7" The right to intimate association,
Brennan wrote, protects highly personal relationships, such as
family groups, from state interference.7 1 The right to expressive association protects collective efforts to engage in protected speech
or religious activities from state interference." The Jaycees' claims
were analyzed by Brennan in light of these categories. In determining whether the local chapters of the Jaycees were of a sufficiently
personal or intimate nature to be considered a constitutionallyprotected form of intimate association, Brennan applied a "size,
selectivity, and seclusion" test and found the Jaycees wanting.73
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609; Rotary International,481 U.S. 537.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623; Rotary International,481 U.S. at 545.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
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He concluded:
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small [nor] selective.
Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of
the association involved the participation of strangers to that relationship.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Jaycees lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its mem74
bers to exclude women.

The Court, while able to easily dispose of the Jaycee's intimate
association claims, was not, however, able to dispose so easily of
the Jaycees' expressive association claims. Justice Brennan found
that the Jaycees engaged in expressive activities independently
protected by the First Amendment because the Jaycees took public
positions on political and economic issues7 5 and because members
engaged in lobbying, fundraising, and a number of civic and charitable activities.7 6 Accordingly, the Court found that by requiring
the Jaycees to admit women as full-voting members, the Minnesota public accommodations law at issue infringed on First
Amendment rights by interfering with the Jaycees' internal organization and activities.77
The Court recognized, as a rule, that where protected expressive
activity is at issue, governmental interference with such activity is
subjected to strict review. 78 Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must show that such legislation serves a compelling state
interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means.7 9 Hence,
in the Jaycees case, the Court had to determine whether the Minnesota public accommodations statute served such an interest and
if so whether it advanced this interest through the least restrictive

means. 80
The Supreme Court held that the Minnesota law at issue did
pass strict scrutiny.8 1 Justice Brennan found that the elimination
of sex discrimination was a compelling state interest "of the highest order ' ' 82 and further found that Minnesota advanced this interest by the least restrictive means available.8 ' He concluded that
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 621.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 623.
See id.
Id.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 626.

1994

Putting Hudnut in Perspective

the public accommodations law imposed no "serious burdens on
the male members' freedom of expressive association ' 8 4 and that,

at best, it imposed only an incidental burden unrelated to any
viewpoints the Jaycees might wish to advance.85 Justice Brennan
wrote:
The Act requires no change in the Jaycees creed of promoting the interests
of young men and imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to
exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of
existing members ....

In the absence of a showing far more substantial

than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual
stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women to
vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of
the organization's speech.8 6

The Court's holding in the Jaycees case, that the elimination of
sex discrimination was a compelling state interest of the highest
order, was based, in large measure, on the Court's earlier findings
in equal protection cases.8 7 In those cases, the Court determined
that sexual stereotyping was archaic, overly broad, and often bore
no relationship to individual capabilities. 8 The Court found that
traditional stereotypes, particularly those related to women in the
workforce, simply bore little relationship to reality and were out of
step with social trends.8 In this case, the Court specifically recognized that equal opportunity in the workplace encompassed equal
opportunities to develop leadership skills, business contacts, and
employment promotions through admission to the Jaycees."
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, which followed on the heels of the Jaycees case, presented
the Court with the same type of potential challenge to its First
Amendment conceptual framework and the Court responded similarly.9 1 Justice Powell, who authored the opinion for the unanimous Court, applied the two-part test developed by Justice Brennan in the Jaycees case and found Rotary International's freedom
84. Id.
85. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
86. Id. at 627-628.
87. Id. at 625.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 626.
90. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626. See also Michael M. Burns, The Exclusion of Women
from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 322-46 (1983) (implicit in the exclusion of women from influential
men's clubs is the idea that men are superior, and accordingly, only men should direct the
public sphere of markets and government).
91. Rotary International,481 U.S. at 539.
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of association claims to be lacking.92 In Justice Powell's view, Rotary Clubs could not pass the "size, selectivity, and seclusion" test
and therefore were not exercising protected forms of intimate association. 3 With regard to Rotary International's claims of expressive association, Justice Powell pointed out that, unlike the
Jaycees, Rotary clubs do not take positions on public policy issues.9 4 Accordingly, Powell found that the California public accommodations statute at issue infringed only slightly, if at all, on the
associational rights of the Rotary clubs. 9 5 The Court held that such
slight infringement was justified by the compelling state interest of
eliminating sex discrimination against women in places of public
accommodations.9 In determining that elimination of sex discrimination was a compelling state interest, Justice Powell relied heavily on the Jaycees Court's reasoning that earlier equal protection
97
cases lead to such a conclusion.
Although the Jaycees and Rotary InternationalCourts were attuned to the constitutional revolution in equal protection jurisprudence, the Courts stopped short of addressing the broader jurisprudential conflict between First Amendment rights and equality
claims inherent in the disputes. Although the decisions in these
cases were not based solely on judicial categorization, the Courts
did rely on a constrained approach. Such an approach was possible
because the cases involved gender equality claims that could be
narrowly framed so as to fit the limited view that equality of the
sexes in the workplace means that women and men should be
treated identically.9 8 The constrained approach was also possible
because the infringements on the First Amendment were deemed
to be slight.9 In addition, although the freedom of association
claims in the Jaycees and Rotary cases were asserted in an attempt to maintain the status quo, the Court used the same framework it had used in cases in which similar claims were asserted by
those seeking social change. The Court continued to view First
Amendment freedoms as negative liberties to be protected from
state interference. 0 0 In doing so, the Court did not approach the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Rotary International,481 U.S. at 549.
Id.
See notes 81-85 and 90 and accompanying text.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628; Rotary International,481 U.S. at 549.
See notes 78-81 and 91 and accompanying text.
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cases from the standpoint that freedom of association claims were
also present on the part of women seeking admission to the
Jaycees and the Rotary clubs.
Such an approach would have called for a different vision of
First Amendment freedoms, one conflicting with the framework
the Court had historically utilized for reconciling its role as guardian of minority interests with First Amendment freedoms.1 01 Indeed, this approach flirts with the notion that the state should interfere with free expression rights of powerful groups in society in
order to enhance the rights of less powerful groups and, thus, ensure that the First Amendment fulfills its instrumental function of
advancing social change. This notion challenges the Court's traditional assumption that the diminution of free expression rights of
any group negatively affects the rights of other groups. 0 2 The
Court had advanced this assumption in the past to support protection of minority and dissident expression in the face of government
regulation. 0 3
Fortunately for the Supreme Court, which was committed both
to its First Amendment approach and to the protection of minority
interests, adoption of a more interventionist, positive liberties approach 0 4 to free expression rights by the Court was not necessary
in order for it to uphold the equality demands of women in the
Jaycees and Rotary cases. Due to the unique factors present in
those cases, the Court was able to use a constrained approach,
maintain its First Amendment doctrine, avoid addressing the
larger challenge to its First Amendment conceptual framework,
and still decide in favor of women's equality demands.
C. Pornography versus Anti-Sex-Discrimination Legislation
Unlike the Jaycees and Rotary cases, American Booksellers As0 5 offered a positive liberties challenge to
sociation, Inc. v. Hudnut1
the Court's First Amendment framework which could not be ignored. The dispute in Hudnut centered on a feminist-inspired
anti-pornography ordinance passed by the City of Indianapolis. 0 e
101. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
102. See Thomas I. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment:' A Reply to
Professor MacKinnon, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 130, 138 (1984).
103. Id.
104. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
122-134 (1970) for a discussion distinguishing the concepts of negative and positive liberties.
105. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
106. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323. The ordinance provides in pertinent part:
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The ordinance, which would have tightened governmental control
over pornography, was similar to other ordinances proposed across
the country 10 7 that were supported by feminists and social conservatives.108 The feminists who fashioned the anti-pornography ordinance intentionally avoided any use of the term "obscenity" to describe the material they sought to prohibit because of their
displeasure with the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity and
the premises behind its regulation. 0 9 Instead, the anti-pornography ordinance defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women . . . in words or . . .pictures."" 0
Under the terms of the ordinance, words or pictures portraying
women in any one of six degrading or violent scenarios constituted
pornography."' In addition, four particular practices associated
with pornography were prohibited. The ordinance banned trafficking in pornography,' 1 coercing a person into a pornographic performance, 13 forcing pornography on a person,"' and assaulting a
Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex which denies women equal
opportunities in society. Pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a
basis for discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and
subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities
for equality of rights in employment, education, access to and use of public accommodations, and acquisition of real property; promote rape, battery, child abuse, kidnapping and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement of laws against such acts; and contribute significantly to restricting women in particular from full exercise of
citizenship and participation in public life, including neighborhoods.
INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., ORDINANCE 35, sec. 1, §16-1(2) (June 15, 1984)
[cited as Indianapolis Ordinance].
107. HOFF, cited at note 1, at 345. Los Angeles, Cal.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Cambridge,
Mass.; and Bellingham, Wash. considered similar ordinances. The Bellingham ordinance was
adopted and subsequently declared unconstitutional. Id. The Minneapolis ordinance was
passed by the City Council and then vetoed by the Mayor. Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights"
Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New Developments in Pornography
Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27, 28 n. 5 (1986).
108. Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REV.
460, 460 (1984). Not all feminists supported these proposed ordinances. For instance, the
Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force ("FACT") questioned "whether images cause violent
acts; whether coalitions with the right wing will thwart feminist goals; whether law is the
best strategy for changing misogynist attitudes." Mary Kay Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?,Ms., Apr. 1985, at 37.
109. Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 519-20. See notes 126-129 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's definition of and approach to obscenity).
110. INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, cited at note 106, sec. 2, § 16-3(v).
111. INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, cited at note 106, sec. 2, §16-3(v). Words or pictures
portraying men, children, or transsexuals in any one of the six degrading or violent scenarios
also constituted pornography. Id.
112. Id., sec. 2, § 16-3(g)(4).
113. Id., sec. 2, § 16-3(g)(5).
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person as a result of using pornography. 1 5 The ordinance also created a cause of action in the nature of a civil rights claim for individuals allegedly aggrieved by the prohibited practices."" The
complainants are afforded either monetary" 7 or injunctive relief by
the ordinance. 118
The City of Indianapolis' passage of the anti-pornography ordinance was promoted, in large measure, by the City-County Council's ("Council") findings on the impact of pornography on women.
Specifically, the Council found:
Pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and
contempt it promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's
opportunities for equality of rights [of all kinds] . . . and contribute significantly to restricting women in particular from full exercise of citizenship
and participation in public life. .... 9

The Council concluded that pornography was sexually discriminatory because it promoted a limited view of women as sexual objects
and because it fostered violence against women.1 20
The feminist theorists who formulated and promoted the Indianapolis ordinance made two basic contentions about pornography
and its relationship to First Amendment protection. First, they argued that pornography is not speech. 2 ' Rather, they argued, pornography is a form of conduct (the practice of sex discrimination)
and thus does not fall under the rubric of First Amendment protection.' 2 2 As Catherine MacKinnon, the co-author of the model
ordinance upon which the Indianapolis ordinance was based, 23
wrote:
The fact that pornography, in a feminist view, furthers the idea of the sexual inferiority of women, does not make the pornography itself a political
idea. That one can express the idea a practice embodies does not make that
practice into an idea. Pornography is not an idea anymore than segregation
114.

Id., sec. 2, § 16-3(g)(6).

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
(1987).
122.

Id., sec. 2, § 16-3(g)(7).
INDIANAPOLIS ORDINANCE, cited at note 106, sec. 2,

§ 16-17.

Id., sec. 5, § 16-26(d):
Id., sec. 2, § 16-27.
Id., sec. 1, § 16-1(a)(2).

Id.
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,

Not A Moral Issue, in FEMINISM

UNMODIFIED 146, 154

Id.

123. David Bryden, Between Two Constitutions:Feminism and Pornography,2 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 147, 148 (1985).
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is an idea, although4 both institutionalize the idea of the inferiority of one
group to another.2

In the alternative, the feminist theorists contended that the government must regulate pornography on a content basis because
suppression of pornography is essential to the pursuit of equality
for women. 12 5 Feminist supporters of the ordinance found the Supreme Court's approach to pornography, in the guise of obscenity,
fundamentally flawed. These supporters asserted that the Supreme
Court had incorrectly framed the constitutional debate over pornography. They argued that the First Amendment debate over
pornography should properly concern the values of liberty and
equality, not liberty and morality. 26 Pornography's subject matter
is not sex, but power, they asserted.1 27 Therefore, pornography
should be regulated, not as the Supreme Court theorized, because
it offends the dominant community standards of sexual morality
and lacks communicative content, but for precisely the opposite
reasons; because it validates dominant community standards of
29
male power 128 and advocates harmful political ideas.
At the heart of the feminists' challenge to the Supreme Court's
First Amendment theory was the precept that pornography is political expression. 3 0 Feminist supporters of the Indianapolis ordinance also asserted that the Supreme Court's traditional approach
to First Amendment interpretation of political speech is simplistic
and hence faulty. 3 ' To these critics -of First Amendment theory,
the Court's reliance on the marketplace of ideas to discover political truth and enhance democratic decision-making is overly opti124.
125.

cited at note 121.
Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 530-31. See also Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male
Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1 (1985).
126. Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 512. The Supreme Court outlined its definition of
obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court held that material
is obscene if:
(a) . . . 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
MACKINNON,

that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ...

; (b) .

.

. the

work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
127. Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 530-31.
128. Id. at 519.
129. Id. at 521.
130. Id. See also Beverly LaBelle, The Propagandaof Misogyny, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 168, 172 (Laura Lederer ed. 1980).
131. Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 521.
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mistic at best.132
Feminist theorists argue that the Court's notion of the free marketplace of ideas is based upon the same naive laissez-faire confidence that inspired the concept of the economic free marketplace,133 a theory based on the presupposition that economic
bargaining takes place between relative equals. Accordingly, under
the free marketplace theory, the government should not intervene.
However, after portions of the economy fell to monopolistic control, congressional regulation was needed to restore the balance in
the economic marketplace so that it could function properly. Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld this governmental intervention
into the economic marketplace. 34 Advocates of the anti-pornography ordinance argued that the free marketplace of ideas also suffers from monopolistic control. They contended that men's voices
dominate the marketplace of ideas,1 35 and pornography is political
propaganda that supports men's control. 136 It is believed that pornography silences women by terrorizing them. 3 7 To these feminist
theorists, the free marketplace model is inadequate. In their view,
the preconditions necessary for the model to function in the case of
women are not present.1 38 Truth, feminists argue, cannot be discovered when a powerful group, men, through pornography, makes
the voices of a powerless group, women, inaudible. 139 Consequently, supporters of the ordinance argued that governmental intervention was required to restore the balance in the marketplace
.of ideas. 4 °
Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon, co-authors of the
model ordinance on which the Indianapolis version was based, contended that:
The First Amendment mainly prohibits state acts that interfere with
speech. But there is an affirmative, if less prominent side, to the First
Amendment that would allow the silence of women because of discrimination to be taken into the balance. The fairness doctrine in broadcasting, for
132. MACKINNON, cited at note 121, at 155.
133. Id.
134. ROBERT G. McCLosKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 132 (1972). See also, e.g.,
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
135. Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 521.
136. Id. at 518.
137. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,

138.
139.
140.

127, 130 (1987).
Id. at 129.
MACKINNON, cited at note 121; Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 522.
MACKINNON, cited at note 121, at 158; Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 521-22.
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example, recognizes that government sometimes has an obligation to help
make access to speech available on an equal basis. The First Amendment's
goals are furthered by restricting thespeech of some so that others might
have access to it. . . Equal access to the means of speech, which pornography discriminately denies to women sexually and socially, is a First Amend14 1
ment goal that is furthered by this law.

To these feminist theorists, the First Amendment, as currently interpreted vis-a-vis pornography, does not enhance equal social and
political power and, thus, supports political oppression. It is an ob14
stacle to social change on behalf of women. 1
Accordingly, Hudnut not only presented a direct challenge to
the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine but also openly challenged
the Court's First Amendment conceptual framework and the premises underlying it. The Indianapolis ordinance's civil rights approach to pornography pitted women's free expression rights and
equality demands against the free expression rights of those who
opposed the ordinance. In other words, the Indianapolis ordinance
was premised on the notion that not one, but two sets of free expression rights were at stake, those of women and those who opposed the ordinance." 31 Moreover, the Indianapolis ordinance took
a positive liberties approach-one which views free expression as
positive liberties, the protection of which requires state intervention, not state neutrality." Thus, the ordinance's approach was
clearly at odds with the Court's traditional framework.
The feminist theorists who wrote the Indianapolis ordinance argued that a negative liberties approach did not meet women's free
expression and equality concerns. Specifically, these feminists contended that such an approach failed to take into account the link
between women's unequal status in American society and free expression constraints on women.145 The theorists alleged that
women's free expression rights have been limited by women's unequal status in society, as well as by governmentally-imposed restrictions on the content of women's speech. These feminists contended that historically women have been taught through various
means, including pornography, to remain silent, passive, and subservient to male authority and that these culturally-imposed re141.

Bryden, cited at note 123, at 171-72 (quoting Dworkin and MacKinnon).

142. Anti-PornographyLaw and First Amendment Values, cited at note 108, at 475.
143. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, in F'MINISM
UNMODIFIED, cited at note 121, at 206, 207-08.
144. Id.
145.

MAcKINNON, cited at note 137, at 129; Andrea Dworkin, For Men, Freedom of
BACK THE NIGHT, cited at note 130, at 256-58.

Speech; For Women, Silence Please, in TAKE
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straints on women's thoughts and behaviors constrain women's
ability to speak.14 Thus, from this perspective, a negative liberties
approach focused on state neutrality in the field of ideas offers little solace to women who have been denied their free expression
rights because of their status as women. Rather, the feminists argued, a negative liberties approach only ensures that men, who
have not suffered from the same kinds of culturally-imposed
speech constraints, will have an effective guarantee of freedom of
expression and hence, will be able to maintain their dominant status in society.." 7
Accordingly, Hudnut raised the prospect that by employing a
negative liberties approach, the Court's First Amendment framework could achieve a result directly opposite to that intended by
the Court. In other words, use of the framework by the Court could
forestall, not advance, the First Amendment's function as an instrument for the protection of minority interests and as a vehicle
for social change, thereby diminishing not only women's rights but
the First Amendment itself. Hudnut suggests that a new framework incorporating a positive liberties approach to free expression
rights is needed in order to guarantee meaningful free expression
rights to all groups and to further the role of the First Amendment
as an instrument for social change and as a vehicle for the protection of minority interests. Accordingly, Hudnut ultimately challenges the notion that the Supreme Court's First Amendment conceptual framework adequately deals with the complexity of the
relationship between the constitutional values of liberty and equality. It does this by pointing to the fact that allowing some groups
unrestrained speech silences others.
Judge Easterbrook wrote the Seventh Circuit's response to the
challenge contained in the Indianapolis ordinance.14 8 In support of
the court's holding that the ordinance constituted discrimination
on the basis of viewpoint, a form of thought control, Easterbrook
relied on the Supreme Court's traditional First Amendment framework. 4 9 He asserted, as the Supreme Court had in the past, that
freedoms of expression are negative liberties. Easterbrook wrote:
The ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech.
Speech treating women in the approved way in -- sexual encounters "pre146. See MAcKINNON, cited at note 137, at 129-30; Dworkin, cited at note 145, at 25658.
147. See Dworkin, cited at note 130, at 258; Hoffman, cited at note 6, at 531.
148. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324.
149. Id. at 328.
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mised on equality" -- is lawful no matter how sexually explicit. Speech
treating women in the disapproved way -- as submissive in matters sexual or
as enjoying humiliation -- is unlawful no matter how significant the literary,
artistic, or political qualities of the word taken as a whole. The state may
not ordain preferred viewpoints in this way. The Constitution forbids the
state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents. 150

Although Easterbrook accepted the legislation's premise that pornography is part of a socialization process that leads to women's
secondary status, he nevertheless contended that this premise simply demonstrated that pornography is powerful and effective
speech and, is thus, perhaps best answered by more speech."' Easterbrook was similarly unwilling to abandon the free marketplace
model. He argued that, although the free marketplace theory rests
upon the assumption that truth is more likely to emerge from discussion unrestrained by government regulation, the viability of the
theory does not depend upon the actual emergence of truth.15 2 He
therefore rejected the feminist argument embodied in the ordinance that regulation of the free marketplace of ideas is necessary
to effectively counter the false ideas about women propagated
through pornography. 53 Easterbrook wrote:
A power to limit speech on the ground that truth has not yet prevailed and
is not likely to prevail implies the power to declare truth .... If the gov-

ernment may declare the truth, why wait for the failure of speech? Under
the First Amendment, however, there is no such thing as a false idea, so the
government may not restrict speech on the ground that in a free exchange
truth is not yet dominant .... The Supreme Court has rejected the posi-

tion that speech must be "effectively answerable" to be protected by the
Constitution.' "

Easterbrook forcefully defended the Supreme Court's traditional
framework for implementing its vision of the First Amendment as
an instrument for social change and as a vehicle for the protection
of minority interests. He believed that the Court's framework correctly dealt with the complexity of the relationship between the
constitutional values of liberty and equality. Easterbrook opined:
Free speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking change. Governments that want stasis start by restricting speech. Culture is a powerful
force of continuity; Indianapolis paints pornography as part of the culture
of power. Change in any complex system ultimately depends on the ability
150. Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 329 n.2.
152. Id. at 330-31.
153. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330.
154. Id. at 330-31 (citation omitted).
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of outsiders to challenge accepted views and reigning institutions. Without a
strong guarantee of freedom of speech, there is no effective right to challenge what is.' 66

Feminist advocates of the Indianapolis ordinance would agree in
principle with this statement. The problem with the decision, in
their view, was that it would accomplish precisely the opposite of
what Easterbrook stated was necessary. Women, these advocates
suggested, historically have never had a strong guarantee of freedom of speech, and the Court's ruling ensures that this situation
would remain unchanged."'6 Catherine MacKinnon summed up the
feminists' objections to Easterbrook's interpretation of the First
Amendment when she wrote: "[W]hile the First Amendment supports pornography, believing that . . . progress [is] facilitated by
allowing all views, however, divergent and unorthodox, it fails to
notice that pornography ... is not at all divergent or unorthodox.
It is the ruling ideology. Feminism, the dissenting view, is suppressed by pornography.' ' 57 Despite these objections to the Seventh Circuit's decision, the holding was summarily affirmed without an opinion by the Supreme Court. 58 In affirming, the Court
abandoned its prior decisional pattern in cases involving anti-sexdiscrimination legislation and First Amendment rights. Unlike in
previous cases, the anti-sex-discrimination legislation at issue in
Hudnut was not upheld. The Court did not uphold the equality
claims brought on behalf of women and thus did not advance the
pace of social reform while adhering to its First Amendment
framework and doctrines.
D. Academic
Legislation

Freedom

versus

Anti-Sex-Discrimination

Following Hudnut and the men's club cases, the Supreme Court
was faced with one additional case in which legislation barring sex
discrimination gave rise to a claim that called into question its
First Amendment conceptual framework. In that case, the University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 15' 9 the University of Pennsylvania
("University") had denied tenure to Rosalie Tung ("Tung"), an associate professor of business.'6 0 Subsequently, Tung filed a claim
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 332.
See MAcKINNON, cited at note 143, at 210-13.
MAcKINNON, cited at note 121, at 155-56.
Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001.
493 U.S. 182 (1990).
University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 185.
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with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
in which she alleged, among other charges, that she had been a
victim of illegal sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.1 61 The EEOC, as part of its investigation, subpoenaed Tung's tenure file from the University. along with the tenure
files of five male faculty members who had allegedly received more
favorable treatment.'6 2 The University refused to comply with the
EEOC's subpoena and instead asked the EEOC to modify its request to exclude certain "confidential peer review information"
such as letters from outside reviewers and internal faculty committee deliberations.'6 3 The EEOC refused to modify its subpoena16 4
and the University therefore did not produce the subpoenaed documents. 165 Consequently, the EEOC applied for an enforcement order of its subpoena.' In the enforcement proceedings the University asserted, as it had during the entire EEOC investigation
process, a First Amendment right of academic freedom against
wholesale disclosure of the "confidential and peer review information" sought by the EEOC. 6 7 The University contended that
"First Amendment principles of academic freedom required the
recognition of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing
approach that would require the EEOC to demonstrate some particularized need, beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials."' 6 8
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, rejected the University's First Amendment arguments.6 9 Blackmun found that the University's claim did not comport with any right of academic freedom currently recognized
under case law. 70 In its finding, the Court, per Blackmun, used
judicial categorization to dispose of the University's claim, thereby
returning the Supreme Court full circle to the approach it had
used earlier in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Rela161. Id.
162. Id. at 186.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 187.
165. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 188.
166. Id. at 187.
167. Id. The University also asserted a common-law privilege grounded in Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 against the disclosure of the peer review material sought by the
EEOC. Id. The Court rejected that claim. Id. at 189.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 201.
170. University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 199.
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tions Commission.17 1 Under this approach the Supreme Court was
once again able to respond positively to the moderate, liberal demands of women in the workforce without undergoing the difficult
task of reassessing its First Amendment framework and theory.
IV.

RECONCILING Hudnut with OTHER FREE EXPRESSION RIGHTS/
ANTI-SEX-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION DECISIONS: THE REASONS
UNDERLYING THE DISPARATE OUTCOMES

In summary, Hudnut is the only anti-sex-discrimination legislation case in which the Supreme Court was not able to adhere to its
First Amendment framework and doctrines and still respond positively to the equality demands of women by upholding the antisex-discrimination legislation in dispute. Accordingly, in affirming
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hudnut, the Court appeared to
break its decisional pattern. The reasons for this apparent break,
to a large degree, may lie in the differing theoretical underpinnings
of the various anti-sex-discrimination measures. Aside from the Indianapolis ordinance, none of the other legislation is aimed at
viewpoint discrimination 172 or at transforming women's status in
the private sphere 173 and thus, is commensurate with the underlying goals and premises of liberal, not radical, feminist theory. 7 4
Liberal feminist theory focuses on obtaining rights in the public
sphere for women that men already have gained, such as equal employment opportunities.7 5 It does not fundamentally question basic liberal assumptions concerning individualism 17 or the desirability of state neutrality in the private sphere. 177 Moreover, liberal
feminist jurisprudence has not embraced the notion that viewpoint-oriented regulation of protected categories of expression is
necessary in order to advance social reform on behalf of women as
a group.178 Simply stated, liberal feminist theory does not reject
the underlying premises of modern liberal theory to which the Su171. See note 37.
172. See notes 31-38, 49-51, 54-57, 63, 81-82, 156 and accompanying text.
173. See notes 31, 54-57, 88, 155-56 and accompanying text. The term "private
sphere" refers to the realm of home and domestic life and, when used, is often counterpoised to the term "public sphere," the realm of commerce, work, and politics. See, e.g.,
Rhode, cited at note 28, at 266.
174. See notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
175. Ann C. Scales, Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 427 (1981).
176. JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN 247 (1981)..

177. See ELSHTAIN, cited at note 176, at 247-49.
178. See, e.g., WENDY KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM 199-203
CENSORSHIP

(Varda Burstyn ed. 1985).

(1990); WOMEN AGAINST
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preme Court lays claim for its general philosophical approach to
constitutional governance. 79
Hence, aside from the Indianapolis ordinance, there was no fundamental theoretical incompatibility between the anti-sex-discrimination measures and the Court's liberal, categorical approach to
free expression rights '8 0 and to its individualistic public sphere-oriented approach to gender equality.1 8 ' This theoretical compatibility between these anti-sex-discrimination measures and the Court,
therefore, may have contributed to the Court's sympathetic approach to the equality claims present in the litigation, despite the
fact that, in all the litigation, the disputing arrangements were inconsistent with the Court's First Amendment conceptual framework.182 In reviewing anti-sex-discrimination measures, the Court
could more easily positively respond to the equality claims of
women because the demands were liberal, oriented toward securing
equal opportunities in the workplace, 8 3 and the measures reached
unprotected categories of expression' or involved viewpoint-neutral limitations on expression.' 85 The Court could therefore dispose of the First Amendment claims by such methods as judicial
categorization and avoid addressing the challenges to its First
Amendment conceptual framework inherent in these disputes.
Theoretical compatibility was absent in Hudnut. In fact, the
theoretical underpinnings of the Indianapolis ordinance were antithetical to the liberal theory embraced by the Court in its jurisprudence. Although the ordinance's provisions were couched in the
language of liberalism, its premises were radical. 186 The ordinance,
from Judge Easterbrook's perspective, sought to redefine pornography as political expression.' 7 In so doing, the ordinance attacked
not only the Court's obscenity doctrine but also its traditional free
speech categories. Moreover, the equality demands embodied in
the ordinance called for state intervention into the private sphere
in order to advance social reform on behalf of women. ' 88 The ordi179.
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180.
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nance's supporters argued that such an interventionist approach
was necessary because the Court's traditional First Amendment
approach fails women; it does not deal with the nongovernmental
socially-imposed speech constraints on women that impede them
as a group from achieving equal status in American society.18 9
Hence, the Indianapolis ordinance's premises not only challenged
the Court's vision of First Amendment freedoms as negative liberties and its corollary use of free marketplace theory, but also its
individualistic, public sphere-oriented approach to gender equality.
Its premises suggested that the Court's framework is both time
and situation-bound 9 0 and thus raised questions about its general
utility.
The ordinance's theoretical challenges both to the Court's First
Amendment conceptual framework and to its vision of gender
equality also combined to directly confront the Court at an institutional level. Both of these challenges raised questions about the
Court's vision of itself as the protector of minority interests and
the guardian of American democracy, questions especially troubling for an institution which has struggled to find a role for itself in
the American political system. 91 Finally, because the Court is a
legal institution steeped in values of tradition and precedent, the
Indianapolis ordinance's radical premises flew in the face of the
Court's conservative and incremental approach to social change.' e
Thus, the disparity in outcomes between Hudnut and other antisex-discrimination legislation cases, in all likelihood, stemmed
from the difference in the array of challenges that Hudnut brought
before the Supreme Court. All of the other cases offered challenges
to the Court's First Amendment conceptual framework simply because of the disputing arrangements presented in the cases. Some,
including Hudnut, offered additional challenges because the Court
found that the opponents of the anti-sex-discrimination legislation
had indeed asserted valid First Amendment claims.1 93 Only Hudnut, however, offered direct challenges to the Court's First Amendment framework, its vision of gender equality, and its institutional
role. Given these additional challenges, the Supreme Court, in
Hudnut, could not easily use the constrained, sympathetic ap189. See notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. McCLOSKEY, cited at note 134, at 182-83 (arguing that the Supreme Court has
had to adopt new roles over time in response to changing national interests and values).
192. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 6-7 (4th ed. 1992).
193. See notes 75, 91, 143 and accompanying text.
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proach it had used toward the anti-sex-discrimination legislation
at issue in the other cases. It could not adhere to its First Amendment doctrines and framework and still find in favor of the Indianapolis ordinance. To uphold the ordinance, given its theoretical
premises, the Court would have had to alter its use of traditional
free speech categories, adopt a new First Amendment conceptual
framework, and reorient its approach to gender equality. In so doing, the Court would have had to reject basic premises of liberal
theory. In effect, the Court would have been forced to admit that it
failed to adequately perform its role as the protector of minority
interests and guardian of American democracy because of its liberal theoretical approach to free expression rights and gender
equality. Both from a theoretical and an institutional level, the Indianapolis ordinance simply asked too much from the Court.
V.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ANTI-SEX-DISCRIMINATION

LEGISLATION: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
CASES

Hudnut, read in context with all of the other Supreme Court
cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation, provides insight into the modern relationship
between freedom of expression as a civil liberty and legislative attempts to equalize women's status in American society. Despite the
Court's affirmance of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hudnut, the
Supreme Court's decisions, taken as a whole, clearly demonstrate
that the Court will not, as a matter of course, strike down anti-sexdiscrimination legislation when confronted with First Amendment
challenges. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Hudnut
cannot stand alone as a guide to the future outcomes of Supreme
Court cases involving free expression challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation. Rather, at most, the Court's decision in
Hudnut can serve to help further delineate the contours of the
Court's approach to such cases.
When read together, the Court's decisions seem to indicate that
there is a link between the modern relationship between freedom
of expression as a civil liberty and legislative attempts to equalize
women's status. The decisions appear to be shaped by the Court's
avowal of liberal theory. In all of the cases other than Hudnut, the
Court was willing to uphold anti-sex-discrimination when the
equality demand involved activity in the public sphere,1 94 when the
194.
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assumptions about women in the dispute were previously abandoned, stereotypical notions about women in the workforce, 195 and
when the legislation either regulated unprotected expression1 96 or
was viewpoint-neutral. 97 However, the Court in Hudnut, was unwilling to uphold anti-sex-discrimination legislation when the
equality demand involved the private sphere of social constraints
9
when the assumptions in the dispute concerned
on speech,9'
women's sexual roles,' 9 9 and where the legislation arguably regulated highly protected political expression2 0 ° and was viewpointdiscriminatory. 2 ' The Supreme Court's decision in Hudnut, coupled with its decisions in all the other cases, thus suggests that the
Court's disposition of cases involving First Amendment challenges
to anti-sex-discrimination legislation may indeed turn on the
Court's view of the nature of the equality demands and free expression claims at stake in the individual cases.
Accordingly, practitioners handling cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation should evaluate their cases in light of the nature of the equality demands and
free expression claims at stake in their respective cases. However,
practitioners should also be aware that this approach to evaluating
anti-sex-discrimination legislation cases is constrained by two important factors. First, the Supreme Court's decisions, taken as a
whole, do not speak to the Court's approach to cases involving
First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation
when the equality demand is liberal in nature, but the legislation
regulates highly protected expression on the basis of viewpoint.
Likewise, the Court's decisions, taken as a whole, do not speak to
the Court's approach to such cases when the legislation regulates
unprotected expression or is viewpoint-neutral, but the equality
demand is radical in nature. In other words, the Court's decisions
only speak to the Court's approach to cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation when both
195. See notes 29, 41-47, 57-59, 88, 154-55 and accompanying text.
196. See notes 37, 58, 170 and accompanying text.
197. See notes 85-86, 95 and accompanying text.
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the equality demand at stake in the dispute and the legislative regulation on expression either conform to or deviate from the tenets
of liberal theory. Thus, the Court's approach to cases which occupy
the middle ground between these two scenarios is unclear. The exact contours of the Court's approach to cases involving First
Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation will
be defined by future cases. Second, the Court's decision in Hudnut, unlike its decisions in other cases involving First Amendment
challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation, is a summary affirmance without opinion.2 2 As such, the Hudnut decision leaves
much to speculation and is of limited precedential value.
From a broader perspective, all of the cases involving First
Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation raise
questions about the conceptual viability of the Court's First
Amendment framework. By raising these questions, the cases
should warn the Court that its First Amendment framework has
only a limited utility. Hudnut, due to the Indianapolis ordinance's
theoretical underpinnings, simply amplifies this warning.
All of the cases attack the conceptual integrity of the Court's
First Amendment framework because the disputing arrangements
are inconsistent with the framework. Free expression rights in
these cases are not aligned, as the framework contemplates, with
minority interests and calls for political and social change, 03 but
rather are aligned with status quo interests. Free expression rights,
in these cases, are asserted by opponents of anti-sex-discrimination
legislation in order to constrain legislative attempts to equalize
women's status in American society. These disputing arrangements
thus cast doubt upon the central tenet of the framework, that protection of free expression rights will result in the protection of minority interests and thus preserve and advance democracy. 0 4
Moreover, the cases' disputing arrangements demonstrate that the
framework inadequately captures the complexity of the interrelationship between free expression rights, minority interests, and
democracy.
Hudnut further attacked the conceptual integrity of the Court's
First Amendment framework because the Indianapolis ordinance's
civil rights approach to pornography posited the idea that the state
must restrict the free expression rights of those who opposed the
202.
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ordinance in order to secure free expression rights for women,
20 5
whose ability to speak had been constrained by pornography.
The ordinance's approach therefore suggested that the framework
misrepresented the nature of free expression rights since it depicted them only as negative liberties to be protected from governmental interference 0 ' rather than as positive liberties which must
be actively advanced by the government. Moreover, the ordinance's approach suggested that the framework is conceptually imperfect because it fails to account for cases, such as Hudnut, in
2 07
which both parties' free expression rights are arguably at issue.
Accordingly, all of the cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation raise the specter that
the Court's First Amendment conceptual framework is contextually limited. Specifically, these cases suggest that the framework is
both time and situation-bound. They advance the idea that the
framework, developed out of a series of early political speech
cases, 2°a is responsive only to a particular set of factual circumstances and thus may not always effectively delineate the free expression and equality issues that arise in future cases involving
First Amendment rights and minority interests. Rather, the framework may actually obscure or distort these issues. Consequently,
all of the cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sexdiscrimination legislation stand for the proposition that the framework will effectively delineate the issues in future cases involving
First Amendment rights and minority interests only when the disputing arrangements resemble the factual settings of those early
political speech cases.
All of the cases involving First Amendment challenges to antisex-discrimination legislation suggest that a new First Amendment
conceptual framework is needed. Specifically, the cases indicate
that the new framework must account for cases in which free expression rights are not openly aligned with minorities seeking
greater political and social equality. Moreover, Hudnut suggests
that the new framework must also take into account cases in which
both parties' free expression rights are at issue. With such a reconceived framework, the Supreme Court will be better prepared to
give thoughtful consideration to the equality and free expression
rights at stake in future cases involving First Amendment rights
205.
206.
207.
208.

See
See
See
See

notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
note 19 and accompanying text.
note 143 and accompanying text.
note 17 and accompanying text.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 32:187

and minority interests. In using a new framework, the Court will
be more likely to openly address the issue of whether the purposes
of the First Amendment will be served by protecting the free expression rights of those who oppose anti-discrimination legislation.
Under a new framework, the Court will focus on whether such protection serves the First Amendment's interest in promoting equality and whether such protection advances freedom of expression
for all groups in society. In weighing all these considerations, the
Supreme Court will not be forced to choose blindly to protect free
expression rights at the expense of minority interests.
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the past two decades, the Supreme Court has decided a
number of cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sexdiscrimination legislation. American Booksellers Association, Inc.
v. Hudnut is only an example. In all of these cases, the Court has
been faced with the prospect of having to choose between protecting free expression rights or protecting minority interests. Such a
choice conflicts with the Court's First Amendment conceptual
framework and thus these cases challenge the Court's traditional
framework. Nevertheless, in all of the cases except Hudnut, the
Court has been able to avoid addressing the challenges mounted
against the framework and still has upheld the anti-sex-discrimination legislation at issue. The Court has been able to do so largely
because the legislation in these cases, unlike Hudnut, is theoretically compatible with the Court's liberal, categorical approach to
free expression rights and with its individualistic, public sphereoriented approach to gender equality. Yet, despite their outcomes,
the cases, including Hudnut, warn the Court that its First Amendment conceptual framework is not a viable one. Rather, all of the
cases involving First Amendment challenges to anti-sex-discrimination legislation suggest that the framework oversimplifies the interrelationship between First Amendment rights, minority interests, and political and social change and thus proves to be an
inadequate guide for the Court in reconciling freedom of expression with equality.

